MOGADISHU (SD) – The Federal Government of Somalia has officially responded to the communiqué issued from the recent “Future Council” meeting held in Kismayo, which contained pointed criticisms of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and other key issues.

The statement, which was sharply critical of the Somali President, also directly addressed the status of Federal Member States whose official terms have expired.

It is controversially claimed that the defeat of Al-Shabaab, the collapse of state institutions, and the recent constitutional amendments “mean nothing.” It further stated that after April 14, the mandate of both houses of parliament would end, which, in their view, would pave the way for Puntland and Jubaland to participate in elections for the House of the People and the Senate.

The opposition groups issued a one-month ultimatum to President Hassan Sheikh, stating that if he does not respond to their demands, early elections will be called in the country.

The Federal Government of Somalia’s formal reply was delivered by its Defence Minister, Ahmed Maallin Fiqi, today. His statement came after the Kismayo meeting concluded with communiqués from opposition figures broadly addressing the country’s general situation, particularly electoral matters.

Minister Fiqi stated that the federal government has, on multiple occasions, initiated dialogue with opposition leaders and some heads of regional states. He added that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has held consultations with various stakeholders since taking office, noting that some of these meetings have been fruitful, while others have seen divergent views among participants.

The minister also pointed out that former leaders who were once part of the National Consultative Council have, at various times, boycotted or withdrawn from meetings held at Villa Somalia, even as the government continues to stress the importance of dialogue and political consensus. The government maintains that the door for dialogue remains open to all political sides.

The “Future Council” meeting in Kismayo was attended by opposition politicians and the leadership of the Jubaland and Puntland regional states. Participants called for a unified political platform to consolidate the opposition’s stance and to resolve existing disputes, especially those concerning the country’s electoral roadmap.

The meeting issued an ultimatum to the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, demanding that he convene a national reconciliation conference within one month to address the country’s general situation, with a specific focus on electoral issues—the most contentious point currently dominating Somalia’s political landscape.

The Kismayo communiqué moves beyond political disagreement into a direct challenge to constitutional legitimacy. By declaring parliamentary terms to end in April and asserting a right to unilaterally form new federal legislatures, Puntland and Jubaland, with opposition backing, are attempting to create parallel governing structures. This is not mere dissent; it is a foundational challenge to the FGS’s authority and the constitutional order, edging the country toward a legal and institutional crisis.

The one-month ultimatum is a strategic move to force a binary outcome and control the political narrative. It puts President Hassan Sheikh in a no-win situation:

If he concedes and calls a conference, he legitimizes the opposition’s maximalist demands and risks being forced into a transitional arrangement that weakens his presidency.

If he ignores it, they can frame him as intransigent and use it as a pretext for further escalatory actions (like forming “interim” administrations), potentially with regional support.

Fiqi’s measured response is a classic defensive diplomatic maneuver. By detailing past dialogue efforts, he paints the government as reasonable and inclusive. Highlighting that opposition figures have themselves boycotted talks shifts blame and portrays the Kismayo group as disruptors. The core message is: We have a process; they are rejecting it. This is aimed at the international community to demonstrate the FGS’s commitment to dialogue while framing the opposition as the obstructive party.

The Kismayo meeting formalizes an opposition alliance with territorial power. The participation of Jubaland and Puntland leaders transforms the opposition from a Mogadishu-centric group into a coalition with its own revenue, security forces, and administrative control. This gives their demands tangible weight and makes the conflict a direct federal vs. member state power struggle, not just a political debate.

This standoff creates a major dilemma for international partners (UN, AU, U.S., EU, etc.). They are invested in the constitutional process and “one person, one vote” elections championed by Mogadishu. However, they also rely on Puntland and Jubaland as security partners against Al-Shabaab. Taking a strong public stand for either side risks alienating a crucial actor. This could lead to cautious, neutral calls for dialogue that lack enforcement, effectively allowing the crisis to fester and potentially paralyze governance and the electoral timeline.

Somalia has entered a perilous new phase, where political opposition has merged with dissent from federal member states to challenge the central government’s constitutional timeline and legitimacy directly. The Kismayo communiqué is less a negotiation offer and more a declaration of political war with a territorial base. The FGS’s strategy, as outlined by Fiqi, is to weather the storm by projecting statesmanship, relying on the slow grind of existing processes, and hoping international support holds. The next month will be critical in determining whether this crisis is resolved at the negotiating table or escalates into a more profound schism that fractures the already fragile federal project.