NEW YORK (SD) – The United Nations Security Council has extended the mandate of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) until December 2026. In a separate but significant decision, the Council voted to close the UN’s political mission in Somalia (UNSOM), which has operated in the country since 1991.

The 15-member Security Council unanimously agreed to terminate UNSOM, fulfilling a key objective long pursued by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who viewed the office as wielding excessive influence over domestic affairs.

The resolution, drafted by the United Kingdom, reaffirms the authorized strength of 11,826 ATMIS troops and police. It strongly emphasizes the continued need for international logistical and financial support to bolster Somali security forces in the fight against Al-Shabaab.

Additionally, the resolution calls for an accelerated joint assessment by the UN, African Union, and the Somali government to expedite the transition of security responsibilities. While initial disagreements arose over UNSOM’s future, the final text confirms it will conclude by October 31, 2026, in line with the established transition plan.

Somalia, along with other African nations, had opposed extending the UN’s political presence in Mogadishu, leading to the final consensus on its closure.

The closure of UNSOM is a monumental political victory for President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. It signifies a decisive shift from a UN-led, trusteeship-style model to a “Somali-owned, Somali-led” framework. For decades, the UN office was a central node in political roadmaps, constitutional processes, and donor coordination. Its removal dramatically reduces direct international oversight, granting Mogadishu unprecedented autonomy to set its political agenda, negotiate directly with bilateral partners (like Türkiye, the UAE, and the U.S.), and manage its own crises. This is the most tangible step yet toward full post-civil war sovereignty.

The two-year extension of AUSSOM alongside UNSOM’s closure reveals the critical gap between political ambition and security reality. While claiming a major sovereignty win, the government accepted that its security forces cannot stand alone. This extension is an implicit admission by Mogadishu and an explicit condition by the Security Council that the Somali National Army (SNA) still requires the backbone of African Union troops to maintain territorial gains against Al-Shabaab. The mission’s rebranding to a “transition” mission in 2022 now faces its true test: a fixed, 31-month deadline to build a competent SNA.

The UK-crafted resolution is a masterclass in balancing competing interests. Closing UNSOM satisfies the government’s core demand for political space.

Extending AUSSOM ensures the continuation of the international counterterrorism mission that protects regional and global security interests.

The resolution ties continued support to capacity-building benchmarks and an accelerated transition plan, ensuring international funds and troops are directed toward a clear exit strategy.

With UNSOM’s direct mediation role ending, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) now has sole ownership of political dialogue. This removes a potential neutral arbiter in escalating disputes with Federal Member States (like the opposition-backed “Future Council” of Puntland and Jubaland). While this grants Mogadishu more control, it also increases its sole accountability for any failure in reconciliation. The government must now directly manage crises like the Kismayo ultimatum without a UN buffer, raising both the stakes and risks of miscalculation.

This decision heralds a new era of international engagement, a shift from integrated, UN-centric oversight to a “lighter footprint,” bilateral-heavy model. Political facilitation will diminish, while security and development aid will continue via direct partnerships with the AU, the U.S., the EU, and others. This reflects a global consensus that sustainable stability requires authentic local leadership, even if it invites greater short-term political volatility. The model’s success depends on the FGS’s ability to govern inclusively and the international community’s patience with a potentially messier political process.

For Al-Shabaab, The group will likely portray the UN departure as an abandonment and a sign of the government’s isolation, using it for propaganda. However, the strengthened AUSSOM mandate ensures military pressure remains.

For regional actors, countries like Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti, which contribute troops to AUSSOM, will see their influence grow as the UN’s coordinating role diminishes.

The absence of UNSOM may embolden federal member states to take a harder line, knowing there is no UN office to facilitate compromise, potentially leading to a more polarized and confrontational domestic politics.

The UNSC decisions represent the most significant recalibration of the international community’s role in Somalia in over a decade. Mogadishu has won its political independence but must now prove it can exercise it responsibly without the safety net of UN mediation. The international community has reduced its political liability but remains deeply invested in the security outcome. This is a high-stakes gamble on the leadership in Somalia. The closure of UNSOM is not the end of international involvement, but the start of a more complex, sovereign, and perilous chapter in which Somalia’s leaders fully hold the pen to write their nation’s next chapter—for better or for worse. The countdown to October 2026 begins now.